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117, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1999).
2.

Can defendant prevail on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel where he has failed to assert any prejudice
caused by his trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance?
Where defendant raises his ineffective assistance claim for
the first time on appeal, this Court reviews the matter on the
record of the underlying trial as a matter of law.

State v.

Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991).
3.

Was the evidence of defendant's attempted escape

sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilt?
A criminal conviction based on a jury verdict will be
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is "so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that ^reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant
committed the crime."

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah

1994)(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 901(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides the
following, as an example of authentication or identification
conforming with the requirement of the rule:
(5) Voice identification. Identification of
a voice, whether heard firsthand or through
mechanical or electronic transmission or
recording, by opinion based upon hearing the
voice at any time under circumstances
connecting it with the alleged speaker.
Utah R. Evid. 901(b) (5) (1999).
2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, governing attempt, provides in
pertinent part:
(1). . . a person is guilty of an attempt to
commit a crime if, acting with the kind of
culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the offense, he engages in
conduct constituting a substantial step
toward commission of the offense.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (1999).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309, governing escape, provides in
pertinent part:
(1) A prisoner is guilty of escape if he
leaves official custody without
authorization.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1) (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count each of coipaunications
fraud, a second degree felony, and attempted escape, a class A
misdemeanor (R. 1-4). Following a jury trial, he was convicted
as charged (R. 121) . On the felony count, the trial court
sentenced him to one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison,
to run consecutively to the sentence he was already serving
(Id.).

On the misdemeanor count, the court sentenced him to one

year in the county jail, to run concurrently and to be served at
the prison (Id.).

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R.

147) .

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant, who spoke with a distinctive East Coast accent
and was sometimes known as "Boston Paul" or "Paul Dansforth", was
incarcerated in the Davis County jail in July of 1998, when the
incident giving rise to the instant charges arose (R. 2; R. 171:
116-17; R. 172: 358, 394, 399, 456; R. 173: 542). While in jail,
defendant befriended 73-year-old inmate Calvin Slaugh, who was
awaiting sentencing on charges of rape and attempted rape of his
mentally retarded daughter (R. 172: 249, 251, 257, 267, 296).
Calvin said of defendant: "[H]e's a little bit smarter than I am.
He's got a gift that I don't have. . . . He can draw you in and
out and then ask you questions and lead you right into the water
as far as I'm concerned" (Id. at 256).
Calvin discussed his case with defendant, and defendant
suggested he could withdraw his guilty plea and then pursue a
defense to the charges (Id. at 256, 259). In the course of
conversation, Calvin mentioned his brother, Ralph Slaugh (Id. at
260).

Defendant volunteered that he knew Ralph because he had

mowed his lawn (Id. at 255). Later, defendant mentioned that one
of-his close relatives was a bail bondsman and, consequently,
that he would soon be released on bail.

If Calvin would give his

brother's telephone number to defendant, defendant would call him
and arrange bail for Calvin as well (Id. at 262, 268). "Calvin
testified that defendant was the only inmate with whom he ever

4

discussed bail and the only inmate to whom he gave Ralph's
telephone number (Id. at 264-65).
Ralph Slaugh testified that he spoke on the telephone three
or four times with someone who identified himself as "Paul/' a
Davis County jail official who was arranging bail for Calvin (Id.
at 307-08).

According to Ralph's testimony, "Paul" instructed

him about bail procedures and told him that "due to the nature of
the offense that my brother was being charged with it was
necessary for them to use an alias for him to protect him from
the other prisoners" (Id. at 309). "Paul" then gave Ralph the
telephone number of a bail bondsman and instructed Ralph to bail
Calvin out using the name of defendant, Joey Silva (Id. at 310).
Ralph did as "Paul" instructed.

He telephoned the bail

bondsman and said that he would bail out "Joey Silva" (R. 171:
160; R. 172: 313). He then met with the bail bondsman at the
Davis County jail, prepared to pledge his home as collateral on a
$25,000 bail bond for the release of his brother, whom he
continued to refer to, as instructed by "Paul," as "Joey Silva"
(R. 171: 160, 163; R. 172; 313).
At about this same period of time, Officer Yeamon, in charge
of Davis County jail operations and security, was investigating a
matter unrelated to this case (R. 171: 115). Monitoring
recordings of telephone calls made from the jail, he happened to
hear defendant's distinctive voice on a tape.

5

His interest was

piqued, and he listened long enough to realize there was a
problem.

Soon thereafter, he called in a detective (Id.).

Yeamon eventually recorded eight conversations involving
defendant (R. 172: 476).
At trial, Todd Harris, the bail bondsman, testified that
defendant called him to say that an individual named Slaugh had
agreed to cosign to get him out of jail (R. 171: 159).
Subsequently, the cosigner also contacted him by phone (Id. at
160).

Harris further testified that he picked up defendant's

booking sheet at the jail and then met with Ralph Slaugh and his
wife in the jail lobby (Id. at 160, 162). Harris was concerned
that the Slaughs did not fully understand the extent of the
commitment involved in using their home as collateral on a bail
bond for someone who did not appear to be related to them.

He

testified:
I've been in the business 11 years and it's
extremely unusual for somebody to put up
their house and put up $25,000 for an
individual who he is not related to and does
not have a very, very close relationship
with. So something was just nagging me in
the back of my mind that I couldn't put at
ease.
(Id. at 165-66).

Pursuing his concern, Harris engaged the

Slaughs in further conversation and learned that the Slaughs
intended to bail out Ralph's brother, Calvin, who was in his
seventies (Id. at 165, 169). Examining defendant's booking
sheet, Harris realized that Calvin was considerably older than
6

defendant (Id. at 169). With further prompting by Harris, Ralph
Slaugh eventually revealed "the whole story" of how he had been
instructed to use defendant's name to bail out his brother (R.
172: 315). At that juncture, the bail process came to an abrupt
halt, and Harris notified the jail authorities "that someone was
trying to pull a scam on Mr. Slaugh" (R. 171: 170; accord R. 172:
313, 315).
At trial, after the court had made foundational rulings as
to admissibility, six witnesses for the State testified about
their familiarity with defendant's voice and to the circumstances
giving rise to that familiarity (R. 171: 113-14, 187-88

R. 172:

476; R. 173: 524-27, 549, 581, 606). Each witness then testified
that they recognized defendant's voice on the incriminating taperecorded conversations made from the jail (R. 117: 113-14,
172: 476

R.

R. 173: 531, 552, 554, 586, 607). Two other witnesses

testified that no one else in jail at that time had a voice like
defendant's (R. 173: 665, 678).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant first argues that the threshold admissibility of
voice recognition testimony should be evaluated under the same
state constitutional standard as is mandated for eyewitness
identification testimony.

He also contends that while the trial

court engaged in the analysis he advocates, it erred in finding
the testimony reliable enough to be admitted.

7

The State asserts that the voice recognition testimony in
this case should be evaluated for foundational admissibility
pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 901(b)(5).

Because the

witnesses knew defendant and could describe the circumstances
under which they had become familiar with his voice, as well as
his personal and distinct vocal peculiarities, their voice
recognition testimony did not raise reliability concerns of
constitutional magnitude.

Any attacks on the accuracy of the

recognitions based on the conditions under which the witnesses
identified defendant's voice would, therefore, go to the weight
of the evidence rather than to its admissibility.

Furthermore,

Utah's state constitutional eyewitness identification analysis is
firmly rooted in scientific research.

Defendant has made no

showing that the scientific basis for questioning eyewitness
identification has anything at all to do with voice recognition,
much less that the two are so closely allied as to warrant
identical constitutional scrutiny.
Second, defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel.

Specifically, he asserts that

his counsel performed deficiently by failing to request a
cautionary jury instruction that mirrored the eyewitness
identification instruction suggested in State v. Long, 721 P.2d
483, 494-95 n.8 (Utah 1986).

Where a lack of sufficient

prejudice is the most expeditious way to dispose of an

8

ineffectiveness claim and where defendant has wholly failed to
assert any prejudicial effect resulting from his counsel's
allegedly deficient performance, his claim necessarily fails.
Finally, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient
to support his conviction for attempted escape.

Defendant,

however, has failed to consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict along with the reasonable
inferences drawn from that evidence.

Together, they plainly

point to a plan of action undertaken by defendant to dupe Ralph
Slaugh into bailing defendant out of jail in lieu of Ralph's
incarcerated brother.

Only the vigilance of the bailbondsman

prevented defendant from achieving his desired end of unlawful
release from jail.

Under these factual circumstances, the jury

could reasonably conclude that defendant intended to escape from
custody and that he had taken a substantial step towards that
end.

No more was necessary to convict him of attempted escape.

9

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN
IT APPLIED THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARD FOR RELIABILITY OF
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
TESTIMONY, IT NONETHELESS PROPERLY
ADMITTED THE VOICE RECOGNITION
TESTIMONY WHERE THE WITNESSES
PERSONALLY KNEW DEFENDANT, WERE
FAMILIAR WITH HIS DISTINCTIVE
VOICE, AND COULD, THEREFORE,
RELIABLY IDENTIFY IT ON TAPE
Defendant asserts first that the admissibility of
"earwitness identification" testimony should be evaluated using
the state constitutional standards that govern the threshold
admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony (Br. of App.
at 18). See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778-82 (Utah 1991);
State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 488-93 (Utah 1986).

Defendant bases

this assertion on the premise that "essentially the same concerns
exist with respect to earwitness identification as do in
situations involving eyewitness identifications" (Br. of App. at
18).

Second, defendant contends that while the trial court

engaged in the analysis he endorses, the court erred in
determining that the voice recognition testimony in this case was
sufficiently reliable to be admitted (Br. of App. at 20). The
gist of defendant's argument, then, is that the trial court
applied the correct law, but reached the wrong result.
The State asserts, to the contrary, that the trial court

10

reached a correct result but did so by applying a legal analysis
neither required by Utah law nor, indeed, ever considered by a
Utah appellate court.
a. A Ramirez-type analysis has never been required as a
constitutional threshold for admitting voice recognition
testimony; such testimony is properly analyzed under rule
901(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
The trial court in this case applied a Ramirez-type analysis
to evaluate the threshold admissibility of the voice recognition
testimony.

And, while both parties at the time agreed that such

an analysis applied, Utah law has never mandated such an approach
(R. 171: 201-02; R. 172: 343; R. 173: 650-55).

Indeed, no Utah

appellate court has ever considered the matter, much less ruled
upon it.
Under current law, the voice recognition testimony here is
properly governed by rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Pursuant to that rule, which governs authentication or
identification, a voice may be identified >xby opinion based upon
hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it
with the alleged speaker."

Utah R. Evid. 901(b)(5)(1999). Thus,

any person may identify a speaker's voice as long as that person
has heard the voice at any time.

See, e.g., United States v.

Cerone, 830 F.2d 938, 949 (8th Cir. 1987).

Typically, "[a]n

assertion by the witness of familiarity coupled with a
description of the circumstances from which knowledge might
reasonably be acquired will . . . suffice" to render the
11

testimony admissible.

2 Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal

Evidence 5 901.5, at 710-11 (4th ed. 1996).

Any attacks on the

accuracy of the identification will therefore go to the weight of
the evidence, rather than to its admissibility, and will
accordingly be resolved by the jury.

Id. at 711; accord United

States v. Alvarez, 860 F.2d 801, 809 (7th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Axselle, 604 F.2d 1330, 1338 (10th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903, 915 (5th Cir. 1979); State v.
Burnison, 795 P.2d 32, 40 (Kan. 1990), State v. Emil, 784 P.2d
956, 958-59 (Nev. 1989).
In this case, each of the witnesses who offered voice
recognition testimony first explained the circumstances giving
rise to their familiarity with defendant's voice (R. 171: 113-16,
187; R. 172: 352-53, 388-91, 411, 415-18, 448-50, 476; R. 173:
495-96).

Then, in turn, the trial court ruled that the

foundational testimony of each witness sufficed to render the
testimony admissible1 (R. 172: 366, 485, 444, 465; R. 173: 51214, 517). Pursuant to rule 901(b)(5), the trial court thus
fulfilled its obligation of ensuring that a reasonable jury could
believe that each witness had sufficient familiarity with
defendant's voice to identify it accurately.

1

Nothing more is

The trial court reached its foundational ruling of
admissibility by applying a Ramirez-type analysis, thus exceeding
the requirements of rule 901. That is, it engaged in a more
stringent inquiry than was actually necessary to establish a
foundation for admissibility.
12

required for voice recognition testimony to be admitted under
rule 901.
b. This Court should not mandate a Ramirez-type analysis
for the admissibility of voice recognition testimony, where
such testimony is offered by witnesses who knew defendant
personally, were familiar with his distinctive voice and,
consequently, could reliably identify it on tape.
Defendant urges this Court to extend the state
constitutional due process analysis for determining the threshold
admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony to voice
recognition testimony as well (Br. of App. at 18). He
rationalizes this expansion in the law by asserting that voice
recognition testimony is subject to the same infirmities as
eyewitness identification testimony and that its admissibility
should, therefore, be governed by the same standard (Id.).
At the outset, the Ramirez state constitutional analysis
represents a distinct departure from federal law.

Ramirez is

rooted in Long, a case firmly grounded in virtually undisputed
scientific research documenting the unreliability of eyewitness
identification testimony.

See Long, 721 P.2d at 488-90 (citing

multiple scientific studies documenting the unreliability of
eyewitness identifications). Both Ramirez and Long break new
state constitutional ground precisely because the Utah Supreme
Court found flawed scientific support for the federal model
governing eyewitness identification.

See Neil v. Biggers, 409

U.S. 188 (1972)(articulating federal due process standard for

13

suggestive eyewitness identifications). In so departing from
federal precedent, the Ramirez court observed:
We noted [in Long! that NN several of the
criteria listed by the Court [in Biggersl are
based on assumptions that are flatly
contradicted by well-respected and
essentially unchallenged empirical studies
[citation omitted]." We then stated that "in
the area of eyewitness identification, the
time has come for a more empirically sound
approach [citation omitted]". . . . Long
committed us to the proposition that a jury
should consider different criteria than those
set out in Biggers when determining the
reliability of eyewitness identifications.
We are bound to apply those same criteria
when the admission of that same evidence is
contested on reliability grounds under the
due process clause of article I, section 7.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780. The Ramirez ruling thus clearly
articulates an analysis that is based on a specific body of
scientific research expressly applicable to eyewitness
identifications.2
Defendant here asserts that voice recognition testimony is
sufficiently analogous to eyewitness identification testimony to
mandate the same constitutional test for reliability.

In urging

In contrast, the federal model articulated in Biggers is
not based on any scientific evidence. And while some federal
courts have chosen to expand the Biggers analysis to include
voice recognition testimony, those that have done so uniformly
fail to acknowledge or evaluate any differences, scientific or
otherwise, between the two. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez,
860 F.2d 801, 809-11 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Pheaster,
544 F.2d 353, 368 (9th Cir. 1976). Moreover, the rule that these
courts have extended is one that this jurisdiction has
specifically rejected as unsound.
14

this expansion, however, defendant fails to cite any cases or
studies documenting that the scientific basis for questioning the
reliability of eyewitness identification has anything at all to
do with voice recognition, much less that the two are so closely
allied as to require identical scrutiny.3
Ignoring the scientific underpinnings of Ramirez and Long,
defendant simply argues that the voice identification testimony
in this case was impermissibly suggestive (Br. of App. at 18-19).
Indeed, he makes no argument that the other four Ramirez
reliability factors, which together with suggestibility comprise
the comprehensive test for the state constitutional admissibility
of eyewitness identification testimony, should also apply here.
The fundamental due process concern addressed by Ramirez is
"'whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the
identification was reliable/'

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781; accord

Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967); Manson v.
Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).

In Ramirez, three victims

of an armed robbery, seated in a police car, were asked to
identify a dark-skinned man handcuffed to a fence, lighted only
by headlights and spotlights shining from nearby police cars.

3

Indeed, the two are facially dissimilar. The typical
eyewitness identification requiring a Ramirez analysis would
involve a crime victim identifying a stranger. Here, not only
were the witnesses uninvolved in the crime but each of them was
already personally familiar with defendant's distinctive voice.
Thus, the voice recognitions at issue here would be analagous to
a witness visually recognizing someone he or she already knew.
15

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 777.

In Long, the identification involved

the victim of a shooting, who had seen the back or side of his
assailant's face for about six seconds during a night-time
assault.

Long, 721 P.2d at 487.

In both Long and Ramirez, the

eyewitness identifications gave rise to the substantial
likelihood of "irreparable misidentification," the central
concern of the due process reliability analysis.

Simmons v.

United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
Under the circumstances of this case, however, there simply
was no substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
The witnesses here all personally knew defendant.

Each witness

was familiar with defendant's distinctive voice from multiple,
previous interactions with him (R. 171: 113-14, 187; R. 172: 38891, 411-12, 448-50; R. 173: 495-96, 502, 524, 549, 581, 606).
For these witnesses to recognize defendant's voice was far more
analogous to an individual recognizing his next door neighbor's
voice or the voice of a friend on the telephone than to a crime
victim or witness identifying a stranger at a crime scene or from
a photo array, as in the cases relied upon by defendant.

See

State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1107, 1111-13 (Utah 1994);
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 777; State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487-88
(Utah 1986) .
And, not only were the witnesses familiar with defendant's
voice, but, according to the testimony of ten of them,
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defendant's voice was particularly distinctive and easily
recognizable due to its strong Boston accent, its nasal tonality,
and the distinctive phraseology defendant routinely employed (R.
171: 116-17; R. 172: 358, 394, 414, 421, 450, 453, 456, 478, 480,
489; R. 173: 496, 498, 525-27, 587, 608, 612).
Two additional witnesses, who worked at the jail, who knew
defendant, and who were familiar with his voice, testified that
no one else in the limited population of the Davis County Jail at
the time the telephone calls were made and recorded, had a voice
that could reasonably be mistaken for defendant's (R. 173: 665,
678).

That the calls were placed by a jail inmate was

undisputed.
Under these circumstances, where each witness had personal
experience with defendant, there is little likelihood that each
witness's immediate recognition of defendant's taped voice was
anything but a product of the witness's own memory of defendant.
Consequently, the constitutional reliability of the testimony is
not implicated and a Ramirez-type analysis is not warranted.
c. To the extent the trial court applied a Ramirez-type
analysis to evaluate the suggestibility of the voice
recognitions, it reached a correct result
Even if this Court were to adopt a Ramirez-type analysis for
reviewing the trial court's admission of the voice recognition
testimony, the determination to admit the evidence would be
affirmed, as would defendant's conviction.
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In raising the suggestibility of the voice recognitions,
defendant has lumped together all of the voice recognition
witnesses, failing to note the significant differences in their
testimony.

In evaluating the circumstances under which the voice

recognitions occurred, however, three distinct categories of
identifications emerge, each of which passes constitutional
muster under the test defendant advocates.
First, Officer Bob Yeamon, who had known defendant for
several years and who described his "unmistakable" voice in
detail, testified that he recognized defendant's voice on tape
sua sponte while he was investigating an unrelated matter (R.
171: 113-18).4

Notably, defendant has not asserted - nor can it

be persuasively argued - that this spontaneous voice recognition
was in any way the product of suggestion.

This identification

alone would provide the necessary nexus between defendant and the
incriminating telephone calls.

Cf. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d

342, 345 (Utah 1985)(citing State v. Kilpatrick, 173 P.2d 284,
285 (1946) and State v. Karas, 136 P. 788, 790 (Utah 1913)(if
voice identification is only evidence connecting defendant to
crime, victim/witness must show both prior familiarity with voice
and some peculiarity of voice that makes it readily

4

Yeamon stated that he was listening to recorded telephone
conversations initiated in the jail when he suddenly recognized
defendant's voice and became interested in the content of the
conversation (R. 172: 476).
18

identifiable)).
Second, Officers Fielding and Brian each listened to the
tape-recorded telephone conversations alone (R. 172: 453, 462,
463; R. 173: 506, 554, 585).5

The inference of suggestibility in

their voice recognitions comes from the physical condition of the
tapes, which were marked "conversations with Joey Silva," or from
the words of the detective who asked if the witness could
identify Joey Silva's voice on the tapes (R. 172: 454; R. 173:
506).

Both witnesses, however, had known defendant for some

time, were quite familiar with his voice, and described its
unique and obvious peculiarities (R. 172: 448-50, 453, 455, 45657, 4 95-98.

Where the trial court made detailed findings and

conclusions articulating that the subsequent identifications made
by these witnesses were the product of memory and not suggestion,
this Court should sustain that determination (R. 172: 464-65; R.
173: 512-13).
Finally, Officers Morrison and Carter listened to the tapes
at a group meeting (R. 172: 424; R. 173: 515, 612). Even this
circumstance, arguably the most suggestive at issue, does not
rise to the level of constitutionally impermissible
suggestibility where each individual knew defendant, was familiar
with his voice, and could describe its unique characteristics (R.

5

Contrary to defendant's assertion, Officer Brian
testified that he listened to the tapes alone. Compare Br. of
App. at 22 with R. 173: 585-86.
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171: 390-91, 394; R. 172: 411-12, 414-16, 421).
In this case, then, even if this Court were to adopt a
Ramirez-type test to evaluate the suggestibility of the voice
identifications, it would necessarily determine as a matter of
law that the trial court engaged in the proper inquiry, made the
appropriate findings, and reached the legally correct conclusion.
For these reasons, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion
to suppress the voice identification testimony should be
affirmed.
POINT TWO
WHERE DEFENDANT CONTENDS THAT HE
RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AT TRIAL BUT FAILS TO
ASSERT ANY PREJUDICIAL EFFECT BASED
ON THE ALLEGEDLY DEFICIENT
PERFORMANCE, HIS CLAIM MUST FAIL
Defendant argues that his trial counsel performed
deficiently by failing to request an eyewitness identification
instruction cautioning the jury about the pitfalls of voice
recognition testimony (Br. of App. at 27-28).

See Long, 721 P.2d

at 494-95 n.8 (suggested cautionary instruction for eyewitness
identification testimony).

Notably, however, while he argues

that such an instruction would have given the jury the
opportunity to "consider the numerous factors that should be
considered in evaluating voice identification testimony/' he does
not assert that such an instruction would have created a
reasonable probability of a different trial outcome for him.
20

See

Br. of App. at 28.
In order to establish constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel, defendant must show that his counsel's
performance was so deficient that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that, but for the deficient
performance, a reasonable probability existed that the outcome of
the trial would have been different.

Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87
(Utah 1990).

The Utah Supreme Court has further stated that a

reviewing court need not determine the deficient performance
prong if there has been no showing of prejudice.

x>

*If it is

easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of
lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be.so,
that course should be followed.'"

State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401,

405 (Utah 1986)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).
In this case, defendant has wholly failed to assert any
claim of prejudice arising from his attorney's alleged
deficiency.6

Instead, he merely asserts that had his counsel

acted differently, the jury could have considered additional
factors in assessing the voice recognition testimony (Br. of App.

Even if this Court were to consider defendant's claim of
deficient performance, that claim would fail from the outset.
Where the rule of law on which defendant bases his assertion of
ineffectiveness has never been adopted in Utah, his counsel
plainly cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to assert it.
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at 28).

Such an assertion falls well short of demonstrating that

a different jury instruction would likely have changed the
outcome of his trial.

For this reason alone, defendant's

ineffectiveness claim must fail.
POINT THREE
THE RECORD EVIDENCE AMPLY SUPPORTS
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR
ATTEMPTED ESCAPE
In conducting a review for sufficiency of the evidence, this
Court should not disturb the jury's verdict "so long as some
evidence and reasonable inferences" support the jury's decision.
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990).
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for attempted escape (Br. of App. at 2930).

The Utah statute governing escape provides that *[a]

prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody
without authorization."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1) (1999).

The

attempt statute provides that "a person is guilty of an attempt
to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability
otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he engages
in* conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission
of the offense."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1)(1999).

In this case, the record contains ample evidence
demonstrating both that defendant intended to escape from jail •
and that he took a substantial step towards doing so. First,
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defendant's intent may be inferred from the record evidence.

See

State v, Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992) ("While evidence
of intent is usually not susceptible of direct proof, it can
often be inferred from circumstance") (citations omitted).

And

second, the record directly demonstrates that defendant took a
substantial step towards making his unlawful departure from jail
a reality.
Calvin Slaugh testified that defendant offered to arrange
for Calvin's bail if Calvin would give defendant his brother's
telephone number (R. 172: 262, 268). Calvin also testified that
defendant was the only person in jail to whom he gave the
telephone number or discussed bail (Id. at 264, 265). Ralph
Slaugh, Calvin's brother, testified that someone who called
himself "Paul" and who said that he worked at the jail, called
and told him he could bail Calvin out, but that he should do so
by using defendant's name rather than Calvin's (Id. at 307-09).
Defendant was also known as "Paul" (R. 172: 456; R. 173: 542).
The telephone calls from "Paul" originated from the jail and
were tape-recorded (R. 171: 60-64).

Officer Yeamon testified

that he was listening to tapes of inmate telephone calls,
investigating something unrelated to this case, when he
recognized defendant's distinctive voice as part of a
conversation that piqued his interest (R. 171: 115; R. 172: 476).
He pursued the matter, eventually recording eight incriminating
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conversations involving defendant, who on several tapes
identified himself as "Paul" (R. 172: 476). He also correlated
the tapes to a log documenting jail telephone use (R. 173: 723).
Another officer testified that he logged in entries documenting
defendant's use of the telephone (R. 173: 693-94).
Officers Fielding and Brian, who knew defendant from
previous dealings with him and who were also familiar with his
distinctive voice, each listened to the tapes individually and
testified unequivocally that the voice on the tape was
defendant's (R. 172: 448, 450, 453, 455, 456; R. 173: 496, 498,
506, 585). In addition, two other officers who also previously
knew defendant and were familiar with his voice listened to the
tapes in a group conference and immediately recognized
defendant's voice (R. 173: 524-27, 531, 533, 606-08, 611).
Under these factual circumstances, the jury could reasonably
have determined that the person holding himself out as "Paul" on
the tapes was, in fact, defendant.

And the jury could also

reasonably infer not only that defendant intended to escape from
custody but also that defendant had taken a substantial step
toward that goal by duping Ralph Slaugh into bailing him out of
jail, thinking all the while it was his brother, Calvin, whose
release he was securing.

Given the facts and the reasonable

inferences drawn from those facts, the evidence sufficed to
sustain the jury's verdict of guilt to the charge of attempted
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escape.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
convictions for communications fraud and attempted escape.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ('

day of April, 2000.
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